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There is little research on whether new information is correctly synthesized in prediction markets.  
Previous studies have found evidence consistent with, but have not proved, gambler misperceptions on 
the existence of momentum effects in the NBA.  I use novel momentum measures that, unlike prior 
studies, incorporate the strengths of the opponent and the wins (or losses).  With these measures, I test 
whether gamblers correctly synthesize information on momentum in the NBA.  Contrary to previous 
studies, I find strong evidence for the existence of a momentum effect.  Furthermore, gamblers 
incorporate momentum into their beliefs on the game outcomes.  Gamblers, however, significantly 
overstate the importance of momentum. But, there is little evidence that the extent of this gambler 
misperception is large enough to generate market inefficiencies, or profit opportunity.  Still, the gambler 
mis-pricing of the information has implications for how well new information is synthesized in other 
types of prediction markets. 
 
 
I would like to thank Joe Price for providing me with data for this analysis and Ryan Rodenberg for his 
helpful comments on this paper.   




Numerous corporations have adopted internal prediction markets, including Best Buy, Chrysler, General 
Electric, Hewlett Packard, Intel, Microsoft, Nokia, and Pfizer.  For example, Google has used prediction 
markets to forecast demand for various products such as gmail, predict performance such as meeting 
certain project deadlines, and predict external events relevant to Google such as industry mergers and 
acquisitions (Dye, 2008).   
While there are some reports that prediction markets can be very accurate (e.g., Berg et al., 2008), 
other evidence suggests there can be biases in prediction markets.  Cowgill et al. (2009) document several 
biases in the prediction markets at Google.  For example, the prices on outcomes that were good for 
Google were over-priced slightly.  In addition, Google’s stock price, which had no bearing on these 
outcomes, typically led to the over-pricing.  The company Best Buy also noted an optimism bias in the 
form of underestimating competitors (Dye, 2008).  
While these studies have considered the accuracy of prediction markets, there has been little 
research on whether participants in prediction markets can correctly synthesize new information into the 
probability of certain outcomes occurring.  The few studies that have examined this have used point 
spreads in gambling markets. 
Gambling markets for professional sports are the most widely-used prediction markets.  Although 
some evidence suggests otherwise (Levitt, 2004), the general theory is that oddsmakers set the odds or 
point spreads based on what the oddsmakers believe gamblers would have as the money-weighted 
median.  Those expectations by gamblers could include irrational (or incorrect) assessments of what 
certain information means, and the oddsmakers aim to set point spreads to account for any gambler 
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irrationality.  Oddsmakers aim not to make money off of incorrect picks by the gamblers, but rather on the 
10% vigorish they charge for losing bets.  So, they aim to set the odds so that one-half of the money is bet 
on each of the two possible outcomes.  If too many bets go to one outcome, they change the point spread 
to attempt to find that median expectation by gamblers.  Thus, the final closing point spread can be 
considered a market price, representing gambler perceptions of the game outcome.  As evidence for this, 
Gandar et al. (1998) find that, in the NBA, changes from the opening point spread to the closing point 
spread improves the accuracy of the point spread as a predictor of the game outcome.  Still, there is room 
for gambler misperceptions. 
Several authors have used point spreads for testing theories about how financial markets operate 
(e.g., Zuber et al., 1985; Gandar et al. 1988; Camerer, 1989; Brown and Sauer, 1993; Gray and Gray, 
1997;  Gandar et al., 1998).  As Gandar et al. (1998) argue, whereas most assets lack an endpoint at which 
a fundamental value can be determined, betting markets have an ultimate fundamental value determined 
by the outcome of the game.  That fundamental value can then be compared to the market-based 
forecast—the point spread. 
At the same time, the determination of the fundamental value (the game outcome) has a 
potentially large random component to it.  Game outcomes are often affected by an incorrect referee call, 
a play that is millimeters away from being in-bounds or out-of-bounds, or perhaps an unexpected strong 
performance by a normally weak player or an uncharacteristically poor performance by a normally strong 
player.   
As a consequence, new information coming in the form of success in prior games (often called 
“momentum”) could be a product of natural random variation.  That is, just as flipping a coin many times 
would occasionally result in long streaks of heads or tails, the randomness to sporting outcomes could 
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lead to a team having a nice winning streak even though the team may not be playing better than its 
normal abilities.  Momentum is a curious concept.  In the NBA, there are examples in which it appears 
that momentum had a large impact on a team’s success—for example, the 8th-seeded New York Knicks in 
1999 had a strong 6-week run in which they played well beyond their abilities, at least as proxied by their 
regular-season record, and made it to the NBA Finals.  At the same time, there are other examples of what 
appeared to be momentum dying out fairly quickly.  For example, the “Memorial Day Massacre” had the 
Boston Celtics crush the Los Angeles Lakers in Game 1 of the 1985 NBA Finals, 148-114.  Boston went 
on to lose the next two games and lose the series in six games. 
Obviously, when a team wins or loses a game by a certain number of points, that imparts some 
information on the quality of the team, as it contributes to their overall statistics.  But, it is uncertain 
whether any abnormal success (or lack thereof) over the past few games has any extra information beyond 
just contributing to a team’s overall statistics.  Can gamblers separate that extra information from 
randomness correctly?  Some evidence suggests that many fans don’t understand randomness in sports 
(Berri and Schmidt, 2010), nor randomness in general (Nickerson, 2002).  Rather, they take game 
outcomes as due entirely to skill and differences in the quality of the two teams.  And, this could lead to a 
biased synthesis of new information.  This raises the question of whether people who gamble on sports 
games also misperceive the role of randomness in a team’s success or lack thereof. 
In this paper, I gauge whether investors (gamblers in this instance) correctly synthesize 
momentum as to how it would affect the price of the outcome.  I examine how several measures of 
success in prior games influence both betting point spreads and results for a given game.  I use NBA data 
from the 1992 season through the 2010 season. 
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A few previous studies examined momentum in the NBA, but just analyzed the effects of winning 
streaks (Camerer, 1989; Sauer and Brown, 1993).  I consider a wider range of momentum measures that 
take into account the strength of the victory—in terms of the strength of the opponent, the margin of 
victory, or some combination of the two.  Whereas the previous studies found evidence suggesting (but 
not proving) that gamblers misperceive a mythical momentum effect, I find strong evidence that a 
momentum effect exists.  However, gamblers significantly overestimate this momentum effect, indicating 
that the market players are not correctly synthesizing this information.  This overestimation, however, is 
relatively minor, as there is no evidence that it leads to market inefficiencies, as indicated by the existence 
of profit opportunities. 
 
PREVIOUS STUDIES  
The initial studies using betting markets examined market efficiency by testing whether there were any 
arbitrage opportunities from systemic biases in point spreads.  Zuber et al. (1985) and Sauer et al. (1988) 
used NFL team statistics and the number of wins to determine if there were any speculative inefficiencies.  
In both studies, the analysis was based on modeling the probability that a team beat the point spread.  
Whereas Zuber et al. (1985) found evidence for inefficiencies and profit opportunity, Sauer et al. (1988) 
found evidence consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis in that there was no profit opportunity.  
Gray and Gray (1997) took this test to the next level by examining whether it could be profitable to use 
certain strategies, such as betting on the home team, the underdog, or the team with the higher predicted 
probability of beating the point spread, based on probit models with team statistics.  They found that 
certain strategies can be profitable (so that the market is inefficient), but they dissipate over time. 
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A few studies on professional basketball examined whether gamblers misperceive the role of 
team success in prior games (sometimes referred to as the “hot hand”, although that is more often used in 
the context of an individual player).   Camerer (1989) finds that bets placed on teams with winning 
streaks are more likely to lose, while bets placed on teams with losing streaks are more likely to win.  He 
argues that this indicates that there is a “hot hand fallacy,” but it is fairly small within the gambling 
market. 
Brown and Sauer (1993) argue that Camerer (1989) does not account for changes in point spreads 
or changes in the assessment of teams’ abilities from the winning streak.  Brown and Sauer (1993) then 
present a test for momentum effects that jointly models the point spread and the actual game score 
difference in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model.  They find that point spreads are clearly 
affected by winning and losing streaks, but the evidence is weak that streaks impact the score difference 
of the game.  Standard errors are too large to conclude that the momentum effect (what they also call the 
“hot hand”) is mythical.  The lack of evidence for a momentum effect, which Vergin (2000) also finds, 
suggests that winning and losing streaks are statistically natural.  This is consistent with the research on 
the individual “hot hand,” which, with the recent exception of Arkes (2010), has found that streaks of 
makes and misses in games are statistically natural as well—see Bar-Eli et al. (2006) for a review of these 
papers. 
A limitation of Brown and Sauer (1993), as well as Camerer (1989), is that winning streaks could 
have little meaning, as it could largely depend on the strength of the opponents.  For example, a winning 
streak of two games could provide very little information on the ability of a team or any momentum the 
team may have if those games were against very weak opponents.  In fact, winning the past few games 
would mean that it is more likely that the past few opponents were weak, which would mean that the next 
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few opponents would more likely be stronger.  That would bias the estimated effect of the winning streak 
on the point spread and the score difference downwards, perhaps counteracting a real momentum effect. 
In this paper, I apply the same methods as Brown and Sauer (1993) to determine if new 
information gets properly synthesized, but consider a series of momentum measures.  These measures 
account for the strength of the opponents over the past few games, which should eliminate any downward 




The data come from two sources: www.covers.com for data from the 1992 to 2004 seasons and Sports 
Insight for data from the 2005 to 2010 seasons.  Both data sets indicate the date of the game, the point 
spread, and the final outcome.  The Sports Insight data include the opening and closing point spread, 
whereas the covers.com data only include the closing point spread.  Thus, the analyses will just use the 
closing point spread.  From these data, I can construct all variables used in the analysis.  
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
A key part of the model is to obtain accurate indicators of the strength of the two teams for their home 
and road games.  I use two general approaches.  The first approach, used by Brown and Sauer (1993), is 
measuring team strength based on the full-season record; the second approach is to measure up-to-date 
team strength at the time of the game.  For a given game, the gambler and oddsmaker would only have the 
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up-to-date statistics.  However, they may have a better sense of the quality of the team than what the up-
to-date statistics indicate, and the full-season statistics (while not observable to the gambler and 
oddsmakers at the time of a game) may be more indicative of how the gambler and oddsmakers perceive 
the team strength to be.  When using the up-to-date statistics (at the time of the game), I only use games 
in which both teams have had at least 15 games at home or on the road, depending on whether the team is 
playing at home or on the road.   
For each approach, I then considered two alternative measures of the team’s home and road 
strengths: the winning percentage and the average point difference (with the average home point 
difference, for example, being measured as the team’s average points at home minus the opponents’ 
average points).  The team’s winning percentage would be indicative of how well the team pulls out close 
games.  At the same time, randomness could often determine the outcome of close games, and a 1-point 
win would count the same as a 20-point win.  The average point difference would not capture how well 
the team pulls out close wins, but it does take into consideration the strength of the win.  It turns out that 
using the point difference explained about 5 percentage points more of the variation in point spreads and 
about 2 percentage points more of the variation in score differences than using the winning percentage.  
Thus, all models use strength measures for the home and road teams based on the average points 
difference for home or road games, either for games up to that point or for the full-season.  The 
momentum measures, described below, will use additional strength measures for the home and road 
teams’ opponents over the last few games. 
An alternative approach for controlling for the home and road team strengths would be to use 
team fixed effects.  But, Arkes and Martinez (2010) argue that doing so would be problematic.  Using 
team fixed effects would factor out the average points difference for each team.  Thus, if a team does 
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better than its average performance in the last few games, then by definition it would be more likely to do 
worse than average in the rest of its games. 
Other control variables are indicators for the number of days of rest before the current game.  The 
variables, for both the home and road teams, are for having no days and one day of rest, with the excluded 
category being two or more days of rest.   
 
MOMENTUM VARIABLES 
I consider several measures of momentum, some based on the past three games and some based on the 
previous game.  Table I describes these measures.  First, to be consistent with the previous studies, there 
are variables for having winning or losing streaks of three games or more.1
The rest of the momentum measures  capture the strength of wins and losses.  The third set of 
measures, introduced in Arkes and Martinez (2010), represent “Adjusted momentum,” which sums up the 
home or road winning percentage of each opponent the team beat in the past three games and subtracts 
“one minus the winning percentage” of the each team they lost to.  For example, a home win against a 
team that has a 0.400 road winning percentage would add 0.400 to this measure; a loss to this team would 
subtract 0.600 to this measure.  Thus, this measure is higher for teams that beat stronger teams, and it is 
lower for teams that lose to weaker teams. Also note that a given win would add 1.0 to the measure (0.400 
  Second, there are variables 
for the number of wins in the past three games.   
                                                          
1 Camerer (1989) considered streaks of 1 to 9-or-more games, and Brown and Sauer (1993) considered streaks of 
two and four games.  I split the difference of Brown and Sauer (1993) and, for the sake of parsimony, just use 
streaks of 3 games, which is consistent with the other measures based on the past three games. 
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– (-0.600)) relative to what a loss would have done to the measure.  This is the primary set of momentum 
variables for this analysis. 
The next set of momentum measures, “Adjusted points momentum,” is similar to “Adjusted 
momentum” in that it gives greater points for beating stronger teams.  The measure takes the point 
difference in the past three games and subtracts the opponents’ average point differences for home or road 
games. 
Finally, there are two sets of momentum variables that measure a strong win or a lopsided loss of 
just the prior game based on the score.  One set of measures has indicators for whether the team won or 
lost by 15-or-more points in the prior game.  The last set of measures has indicators for whether the team 
beat or lost to the point spread by 15-or-more points, thereby taking into account the strength of the 
opponent. 
Table II shows the summary statistics for the two primary models, the first one using games in 
which both teams had played 15 home or road games (depending on whether the team is home or road) 
and the second one using all games in which both teams had played at least 3 games (to measure the 
momentum variables based on the past 3 games).  For the first model, the score difference, in terms of the 
advantage of the home team, has an average of 3.4, while the point spread has an average of 3.5, giving 
an average forecast error of about -0.1.  The home team beat the point spread about 48% of the time.  As 
for the momentum variables, the Adjusted Momentum variables are essentially zero, as they add and 
subtract points based on the strength of the win or loss.  The number of wins in the past 3 games averages 
to 1.5, as would be expected.  In about 16% of the games, teams have a 3-game (or more) winning streak, 
and in another 16% of games, teams have a 3-game losing streak.  Teams won or lost the prior game by 
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15-or-more points about 13 to 14% each.  And, teams beat or lost to the point spread by 15-or-more 
points in the prior game by about 8 to 10% each.  
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The model follows a similar set up as in Brown and Sauer (1993), in which the score difference and point 
spread in a given game are estimated as part of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model.  The 
justification is that the error terms for both models would include factors known to the oddsmakers and 
gamblers, but not observable or quantifiable to the researcher.  For example, if a major player for one of 
the teams is out with an injury, the oddsmakers and gamblers take that into account, but that is 
unobservable to a researcher examining thousands of games; and if it were observable, quantifying its 
impact would be very difficult.  Because the unobservable factors would be relevant to both the score 
difference and the point spread, the error terms for the two equations would be correlated.  Thus, a SUR 
model is appropriate.   
 
The SUR model includes the following two equations:  
 
Di = β1’SiH +  β2’SiR + β3’XiH + β4’XiR +  β5’MiH + β6’MiR +  εiD     (1) 
Pi = γ1’SiH +  γ 2’SiR + γ 3’XiH + γ 4’XiR +  γ5’MiH + γ6’MiR +  εiS     (2)  
 
where Di is the score difference for game i, Pi the point spread, SiH is the strength of the home team for its 
home games, SiR is the strength of the road team for road games, XiH and XiR represent other observable 
factors that may affect the game outcome, and MiH and MiR represent measures of momentum.  The score 
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difference (D) and point spread (P) are both put in terms of the advantage of the home team.  For 
example, a game in which the home team is favored by 5 and wins by 7 points would have D=5 and P=7.  
The point spread is typically the reverse, so that a team favored by 5 would have a point spread of -5.  
But, I reversed it so that it would be consistent with the score difference.   
Note that the outcome of the previous games contributes to both the team strength and the 
momentum measure.  Thus, the effects of momentum are any effects of success (or lack thereof) in the 
past few games over and above what that information indicates for team strength. 
If there were a positive momentum effect, then β5 would be positive and β6 would be negative for 
variables representing success in the prior games (e.g., winning streaks) and the opposite (a negative β5 
and a positive β6) for variables representing the lack of success (e.g., losing streaks).  If gamblers were to 
correctly synthesize how much information momentum conveys to the next game, then it would be the 
case that β5 = γ5 and β6 = γ6. 
There are 12 models based on the set of equations constituting the SUR model.  They are based 
on the two methods of using the current statistics at the time of the game (A models) and using the full-
season statistics (B models), as described above.  And for each of these methods, there is one model for 
each of the six set of momentum variables.  These models indicate how much momentum affects 
subsequent game outcomes and gambler beliefs on those game outcomes. 
This SUR model has been used more recently to examine whether NBA teams tank to better 
position themselves for the draft (Soebbing and Humphreys, 2010).  In addition, an asymptotically-
similar approach of modeling the forecast error (the score difference minus the point spread) and the 
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probability of a team beating the spread has been used to show that there is racial bias among referees in 
the NBA (Larsen, Price, and Wolfers, 2008). 
 
FINAL SAMPLE 
The A models are based on the 12,606 regular-season games in which the home team had at least 15 
home games and the road team had at least 15 road games in a given season.  This makes it so the 
statistics for the average points difference for home or road games is a fairly accurate gauge of the 
strength of the team at home or on the road.  The B models, using the full-season statistics, just require 
that the team played at least 3 games so that the momentum measures can all be calculated.  There are 
18,815 observations for the B models. 
 
RESULTS 
Table III shows the results from the primary models, based on the “Adjusted Momentum” measure.  The 
first three columns are for Model 1A, which is based on up-to-date team strength measures, while the last 
three columns are for Model 1B, based on full-season team strength measures.  The R2 for the two 
equations are 0.20 to 0.21 for the score-difference equation and about 0.75 to 0.79 for the point-spread 
equation. 
Unlike the previous studies, the results show strong evidence for the existence of a momentum 
effect, as success in the prior game(s) has an additional effect beyond just contributing to a team’s overall 
statistics.  The coefficient estimates, recall, are any effect of that success in the prior games beyond that 
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game contributing to the team’s strength (as measured by the up-to-date or full-season points difference 
for home or road games).  An extra win in the past three games (which increases the momentum measure 
by one point) is estimated to increase the score difference in a team’s favor by 0.56 points for the home 
team and 0.51 points for the road team in Model 1A and by 0.50 and 0.37 points for the home and road 
teams in Model 1B.  All of the estimates are significant at the 1% level.   
These effects of momentum, however, are less than what gamblers believe.  In the point-spread 
equations, the estimates on the adjusted momentum variables all are around 0.85 for the home team and -
0.85 for the road team.  All of these estimates are significantly greater in magnitude than the 
corresponding estimate from the score-difference equations, with the difference being between 0.3 and 
0.5. 
Another mis-pricing by gamblers is that they understate the role of the teams’ strengths, as 
measured here by home and road points differences.  The difference in the estimates on the strength 
variables between the two equations are statistically significant at the 1% level for three of the four 
variables in Models 1A and 1B.   
Having one day of rest for the home or road team, relative to having two or more days of rest, is 
not estimated to have any effect on the score difference.  But, gamblers appear to understate the negative 
effect on the road team’s score from having no days of rest. 
Table IV shows the coefficient estimates for the momentum variables from separate models for 
each set of momentum variables in the 12 separate models.  The results from Models 1A and 1B (from 
Table III) lead off the table.  The first salient point from the results is that gamblers certainly perceive 
there to be a momentum effect, as almost all of the coefficient estimates on the momentum variables are 
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statistically significant (p < 0.01) in the point-spread equations except for those in Model 6, for “beating 
the spread by 15+ points.”    But again, it appears that gamblers overstate the true impact of these factors, 
as in almost all cases, the estimates are much higher in magnitude in the point-spread equations than in 
the score-difference equations—in some cases by more than 100%.  In the B models, these differences are 
statistically significant for all but one of the momentum variables based on the past three games (Models 
1 to 4).  In the A models, with the higher standard errors due to the smaller sample, fewer of the 
differences are statistically significant, but they all point to the same pattern of the gambler overstating 
the effect of success in the previous three games.  
The estimates on the momentum variables in Model 2 (“number of wins in the past 3 games”) can 
be compared to those on the “Adjusted momentum” variables in Model 1, as each win adds one point to 
the variable, relative to what it would have been with a loss.  The estimates in Model 2 are slightly lower 
for both the score difference and the point spread, with the estimates being significantly lower in Model 2 
than Model 1 for the point-spread equation.  This suggests that gamblers do distinguish between wins and 
losses against strong and weak teams when considering momentum. 
In Model 3, for every 10-points score difference a team beats its last three opponents over and 
above the opponents’ normal score differences, the team will have an extra 0.23 to 0.28 points in the 
current game.  The gamblers expect that difference to be 0.35 to 0.37, so again they overstate the effect. 
In Model 4, I find that 3-game winning and losing streaks do affect the game outcome, with the 
estimates being statistically significant for three of the four variables in both Models 4A and 4B.  This 
stands in contrast to the previous studies on basketball (i.e., Camerer, 1989; Sauer and Brown, 1993; 
Vergin, 2000).  Reasons for the difference could be due to this study having greater power from more 
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observations and using more precise team-strength control variables by having both home and road 
statistics. 
Model 5 has an interesting result.  The home or road team winning the previous game by 15+ 
points leads to the current-game score difference being about 1 point more in their favor (p < 0.01).  
However, the home or road team losing the previous game by 15+ points has no significant effect on the 
game outcome.  Yet, gamblers expect those large losses to have a negative effect on their performance.  
The differences are significant for three of the four outcomes, albeit only at the 10% level in one case. 
In Model 6, either team beating the point spread by 15+ points in the previous game had no 
significant effect on the current-game score difference.  In this case, it is the gamblers who perceive an 
effect for a team beating the spread by 15+ points, but not losing to the spread by 15+ points.  However, 
none of the differences in estimates are significant.  The finding that gamblers take into account a team 
beating the spread by 15+ points, but not losing to the spread by 15+ points is consistent with Gilovich’s 
(1983) finding that bettors can “explain away” losses, but wins they take as confirmation of how strong 
they perceive a team’s abilities to be.   
One caveat of this analysis is that I assume that the point spreads are based on how gamblers 
price certain aspects.  This viewpoint is further justified in that, if the point spread is different from what 
gamblers believe will occur, then the oddsmakers will adjust the point spread to try to move towards 
equal weighting on each side of the bet.  However, it is possible that the oddsmakers, in some cases, do a 
poor job of predicting how the gamblers would price certain information, even with shifts in the point 




DETECTING MARKET INEFFICIENCIES 
The next question is whether gamblers’ overstated perception of the momentum effect is large enough to 
create inefficiencies in the market, or profit opportunity for those who understand the mis-pricing by 
gamblers.  To do this, I use logit models to predict the probability of the home team beating the spread 
given the momentum measures and other available information.  I estimate this model excluding the 2009 
and 2010 seasons, so that those seasons can be used for out-of-sample predictions, similar to Gray and 
Gray’s (1997) analysis of betting strategies for the NFL.  Furthermore, I only use the models with up-to-
date statistics, as that would be what would be available to a gambler.  For there to be profit opportunity 
in the market, one must be able to predict correctly 52.4% of the games, given the 11-for-10 rule (i.e., the 
10% vigorish).2
Table V presents these success rates from various strategies based on these logit models.  The 
logit models themselves are not included for the sake of saving space.  In column (1), the simple strategy 
of betting on the road team yields a success rate of 51.7%.  Columns (2) through (8) are then based on the 
predicted probabilities from various logit models.  The first of these just includes the days-of-rest and 
team-strength measures (based on up-to-date calculations).  The success rate increases to 53.0%, which is 
not significantly greater than 52.4%.
 
3
In the next row, I take all games in which one team has at least a 52.5% predicted probability of 
beating the spread and calculate the success rate from betting on that team.  For the baseline model 
  Adding the various sets of momentum variables, in columns (3) to 
(8), has hardly any effect on the success rate.   
                                                          
2 The 52.4% break-even point is calculated as follows: given that the gambler has to pay $11 to win $10, the return 
to the bet is 10p + (1-p)*11, where p is the probability of winning the bet; the break-even point where that equals 
zero is p = 0.524. 
3 The statistical significance is calculated based on the binomial probability distribution. 
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without any momentum variables, the success rate increases to 54.1%.  In column (3), using the 
“Adjusted momentum” variables, the success rate increases to 55.1% (for 632 games), which is now 
significant at the 10% level.  Using any of the other sets of momentum variables does not improve upon 
the success rate using the “Adjusted momentum” variables, and none of them are significantly greater 
than 52.4%.  In the next row, I do the same but with games in which one team has a predicted probability 
of beating the spread by at least 55%.  The success rate increases to as high as 56.0% (again, for the 
“Adjusted momentum” variables), but none of these are significantly greater than 52.4%. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Consistent with previous studies, the results of this paper indicate that gamblers incorporate information 
on momentum in their beliefs on the game outcome, which show up in point spreads.  However, unlike 
previous studies, I find evidence indicating that momentum effects are real and not just the product of 
natural variation.  The success in the past three games contributes positively to a team’s performance 
beyond the information the past three games provides for the overall team strength.  For just the previous 
game, I find evidence that wins help, but losses do not.  Whereas, theoretically, measures of momentum 
incorporating the strengths of the opponents and the strengths of the wins/losses in the recent games 
should provide more information on the momentum of the team, there is only weak evidence, in the form 
of slightly higher R-squared’s, that such measures better predict game outcomes or point spreads than the 
conventional measure of momentum—winning streaks.  Perhaps this is an indication of the momentum 
effect, in general, being fairly weak. 
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It is not likely that gamblers (or oddsmakers) would do the calculations that I use in these models.  
But, if they are taking into account what occurred in the past few games, many would likely consider the 
strength of the team’s victories or losses.  Beating a strong team or winning big would count more than 
beating a weak team or just barely winning a game they should have won easily.  The models that do 
incorporate the strength of the opponents into the momentum measures do have (slightly) higher R-
squared’s for both the score-difference and point-spread equations. 
Despite the gamblers being correct that a momentum effect exists, I find evidence indicating that 
gamblers systemically overstate the importance of momentum in how it affects the next game’s outcome.  
When using the full-season team-strength measures, the differences between the actual momentum effect 
on game outcomes and gambler perceptions of the momentum effect on point spreads are statistically 
significant in all but one of the momentum variables based on success in the prior three games.  However, 
in models using the up-to-date team-strength measures, which involve about one-third fewer observations, 
the differences are statistically significant in only about one-half of the cases. 
These differences between the actual and gamblers’ perceptions of the impact of momentum, 
however, may not be large enough to generate inefficiencies in the gambling market.  There was no 
evidence that one could use misguided point spreads (due to gambler misperceptions) to make a profit 
gambling on NBA games. 
Despite there not being evidence indicating market inefficiencies, the evidence does indicate that 
gamblers do not correctly synthesize information on momentum.  What could cause gamblers to overstate 
the effects of momentum?  One possible cause stems from the fact that gambling on sports often involve, 
for many people, emotional stakes as well as financial stakes.  Thus, maintaining objectivity could be 
difficult.  And, gamblers may take their team’s wins as a sign of the team’s strength, but explain away 
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road losses, as Gilovich (1983) argues.  Likewise, gamblers may take the lack of success among teams 
they root against and attribute that to the team being weaker than the truly are.  This would be consistent 
with Nickerson’s (2002) finding that people do not fully recognize the role of randomness in sports 
outcomes. 
The emotional-bias story is consistent with the findings on Google’s prediction markets that over-
optimism biases prices.  In other prediction markets, there could be similar emotional biases.  For 
example, if there were a prediction market on the success of a drug at a pharmaceutical company, 
someone working on developing the drug may have an emotional stake in the outcome.  Thus, they may 
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Table 1.  Measures of momentum  
Momentum 













past 1 or 3 
games 
3-game winning and 
losing streaks 
 
0-1 indicator variables for both 
winning and losing streaks 
No No 3 
Number of games won 
in the past 3 games 
Ranges from 0 to 3 No No 3 
Adjusted momentum 
(primary outcome) 
Add up the home or road winning 
percentages for the team(s) the 
subject beat and subtract the home 
or road winning percentages for 
the team(s) the subject lost to. 
Yes Yes 3 
Adjusted points 
momentum 
Sum up the points difference 
minus the expected points 
difference based on home and road 
average point differences 
Yes Yes 3 
Won/lost by 15+ 
points 
0-1 indicator variables for both 
winning or losing by 15 or more 
points 
No Yes 1 
Beat/lost to spread by 
15+ points 
0-1 indicator variables for both 
beating and losing to the spread by 
15 or more points 





Table 2.  Descriptive statistics. 
 
Models based on up-to-date 
team strengths measures 
(n=12,606) 
Models based on full-season 
team strength measures 
n=18,815 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Outcomes     
Score difference (for home team) 3.399 13.037 3.339 13.017 
Point spread  3.495 6.482 3.433 6.392 
Forecast error -0.096 11.380 -0.093 11.465 
Whether home team beat the spread 0.483 0.500 0.485 0.500 
 
    
Control variables     
Home-team average points   
  difference  (up-to-date) 
3.352 5.253   
Road-team average points  
  difference  (up-to-date) 
-3.325 4.828   
Home-team average  points    
  difference  (full-season) 
  3.295 5.187 
Road-team average  points  
  difference  (full-season) 
  -3.316 4.711 
Home team had 1 day’s rest 0.611 0.488 0.581 0.493 
Home team had 0 day’s rest 0.153 0.360 0.156 0.363 
Road team had 1 day’s rest 0.500 0.500 0.476 0.499 
Road team had 0 day’s rest 0.331 0.471 0.337 0.473 
 
    
Momentum variables     
Adjusted momentum     
  For the home team 0.005 0.901 0.000 0.898 
  For the road team 0.002 0.914 0.005 0.898 
Wins in the past 3 games     
  For the home team 1.497 0.940 1.495 0.942 
  For the road team 1.511 0.952 1.520 0.945 
Adjusted points momentum     
  For the home team 0.049 24.226 -0.129 24.014 
  For the road team 0.123 24.696 0.226 24.266 
3-game winning/losing streaks     
  Winning streak for home team 0.156 0.362 0.156 0.363 
  Losing streak for home team 0.161 0.367 0.162 0.369 
  Winning streak for road team 0.166 0.372 0.164 0.370 
  Losing streak for road team 0.162 0.369 0.157 0.364 
Won or lost last game by 15+ points     
  Home team won 0.136 0.343 0.131 0.338 
  Home team lost 0.128 0.335 0.129 0.335 
  Road team won 0.136 0.342 0.135 0.342 
  Road team lost 0.137 0.344 0.133 0.339 
Beat or lost to the point spread in last 
game by 15+ points 
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  Home team beat spread 0.084 0.277 0.085 0.279 
  Home team lost to spread 0.097 0.296 0.098 0.297 
  Road team beat spread 0.084 0.278 0.087 0.282 





Table 3.  Results for the primary SUR models. 
 Model 1A (n = 12,606) Model 1B (n = 18,815) 
 (based on up-to-date team  
strengths measures) 




















Momentum variables       
Home-team Adjusted   










Road-team Adjusted  










       
Team-strength variables       
Home-team average points  





-0.069***    
Road-team average points 





0.012    
Home-team average  points 
difference  (full-season) 





Road-team average  points 
difference  (full-season) 





       
Days of rest variables (2 or 
more days’ rest is excluded 
category for both home 
and road team) 
      













































R-squared 0.201 0.786  0.210 0.748  
Note: Correlation between “score difference” and “point spread” equations: Model 1A=0.226, Model 1B=0.188  







Table 4.  Coefficient estimates on the momentum variables for the various models. 
 Models based on up-to-date team  
strengths measures (n = 12,606) 
Models based on full-season team  



















 Model 1A Model 1B 
Home-team adjusted  










Road-team adjusted  










R2 0.201 0.786  0.210 0.748  
 Model 2A Model 2B 
Home-team number of    










Road-team number of  










R2 0.198 0.780  0.208 0.747  
 Model 3A Model 3B 
Home-team adjusted  










Road-team adjusted  










R2 0.200 0.787  0.211 0.753  
 Model 4A Model 4B 
Home-team 3-game  










Home-team 3-game  










Road-team 3-game  










Road-team 3-game  










R2 0.197 0.778  0.208 0.736  
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 Model 5A Model 5B 
Home team won last game 










Home team lost last game  










Road team won last game  










Road team lost last game  










R2 0.197 0.765  0.207 0.724  
 Model 6A Model 6B 
Home team beat spread  










Home team lost to spread  










Road team beat spread  










Road team lost to spread  










R2 0.196 0.761  0.207 0.719  






Table 5.  Proportion of 2009 & 2010 season games picked correctly and statistical significance of difference from 0.524 
 
 Predicted probabilities from logit models, with the indicated momentum variables included 
 

























Correctly classified (n = 1542) 0.517 0.530 0.532 0.529 0.530 0.536 0.531 0.518 
 
        
Correctly classified for teams 
















Correctly classified for teams 
















Note: For the last two rows, the number in parentheses is the number of games with a team identified as having at least 52.5% or 55% predicted 
probability of beating the spread.  The logit models, based on data through the 2008 season, include the days-of-rest variables, the up-to-date home 
or road team-strength measures based on the average points difference, and any indicated sets of momentum measures.  The * indicates that the 
proportion of games correctly classified is greater than 0.524 by an amount that is statistically significance at the 10% level.   
